The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus :: Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 4 to 10. ::

Question Three. Whether along with the Divine Simplicity stands the fact that God, or anything formally said of God, is in a Genus

39. Third I ask whether along with the divine simplicity stands the fact that God, or anything formally said of God, is in a Genus.

That it does:

Because God is formally being, but being states a concept said of God in the ‘what’ - and this concept is not proper to God but is common to him and creatures, as was said in distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.26-45]; therefore, in order that this might become proper, it must be determined by some determining concept; that ‘determining’ concept is related to the concept of being as the concept of ‘what sort’ to the concept of ‘what’, and consequently as the concept of difference to the concept of genus.

40. Further, Avicenna Metaphysics II ch.1 (74vb): between ‘a being in a subject’ and ‘a being not in a subject’ there is no middle - and he seems to be speaking according to the fact that ‘a being not in a subject’ is the idea of substance and ‘a being in a subject’ is the idea of accident. Therefore God, since he is being formally and is not ‘a being in a subject’, therefore he is ‘a being in a non-subject’ - therefore he is substance; but substance as substance is a genus.

41. Further, where there is species there is genus - according to Porphyry [Book of Predicables ch.3] - because these are relatives; the divine nature is a species with respect to the persons, according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith ch.48; therefore etc .

42. Again, wisdom is formally said of God, and this according to the same idea by which it is said of us, because the reasons that were set down in distinction 3 question 1 [I d.3 nn.27, 35, 39] about the univocity of being conclude the same about the univocity of wisdom; therefore wisdom, according to the idea in which it is said of God, is a species of a genus [n.153]; and this is proved by the saying of the ancient doctors [Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Aquinas], who say that species is transferred to divine reality, because it states a perfection, although not the genus, because it states an imperfection -as ‘science’ is transferred but not ‘quality’.

43. To the contrary is the Master [Lombard] in the text, and he adduces Augustine [On the Trinity V ch.1 n.2] - and shows through him that from God are removed the categories of the art of dialectic.’

I. First Opinion

A. Exposition of the Opinion

44. Here there are two opinions, at either extreme. - One [Henry of Ghent] is negative, which says that with the divine simplicity does not stand the fact that there is some concept common to God and creatures, and it was touched on above in distinction 3 question 1 [I d.3 n.20].

45. For proof of this certain reasons are set down which were not touched on before [sc. not touched on by Scotus in I d.3 qq.1-3].

The first is this: there is for things that are totally and immediately under the extremes of a contradiction no common univocal term; God and creatures are totally and immediately under the extremes of a contradiction - to depend and not to depend, caused and not caused, to be from another and not to be from another; therefore there is for them no common univocal term.

46. Again second thus, and it is a confirmation of the previous reason: every common concept is neutral with respect to the things to which it is common; no concept is neutral with respect to contradictories, because it is one or other of them; therefore etc .

47. Again third thus: things primarily diverse agree in nothing; God is primarily diverse from any creature, otherwise he would have that in which he would agree and that in which he would differ, and so he would not be simply simple; therefore God agrees in nothing with the creature, and so neither in any common concept.

48. Again, where there is only the unity of attribution there cannot be the unity of univocity; but it is necessary to posit unity of attribution of the creature with respect to God in the idea of being; therefore there is in this no univocity.

49. For this opinion [n.44] is adduced the intention of Dionysius [On the Divine Names ch.7 sect.3, ch.2 sect.7], who posits three grades of knowing God - by eminence, causality, and negation - and he posits that the knowledge by negation is the ultimate, when from God are removed all the things that are common to creatures; therefore he himself does not understand that any concept abstracted from creatures remains in God according to the respect in which it was common to creatures.

50 For this opinion there is also Augustine On the Trinity VIII ch.3 n.5 (in the middle of the chapter): “When you hear of this good and of that good (which could elsewhere also be said to be not good), if you could without the things that are good by participation perceive the good itself, by participation in which they are good (for you also at the same time understand the good itself when you hear of this good and that good), but if you could, with these things taken away, perceive the good in itself, you would perceive God, and if you cleaved to him with love, you will at once be blessed.” Therefore he intends that, by understanding this good and that good, I understand the good by participation in which they are good, and this is ‘the infinite good’; therefore I do not have there only a concept of God in general [I d.3 n.192], but also a concept of the good through its essence.

B. Reasons against the Opinion

51. Against this position [n.44] there are two reasons,⁴⁷ which were touched on above in distinction 3 in the aforesaid question [I d.3 n.35, 27].

[First reason] - One reason is ‘that this concept proper to God could not naturally be caused in our intellect’; for whatever is naturally a mover of our intellect for the present state, whether the agent intellect or a phantasm or an intelligible species of the thing, has for adequate effect causing in us a concept of the quiddity and of what is contained essentially or virtually in such quiddity; but that proper concept is contained in neither way in the quiddity, neither essentially nor virtually (that it is not essentially is plain, because it denies univocity, - that not virtually because the more perfect is never contained in the less perfect); therefore etc .⁴⁸

52. The response of some people ⁴⁹ is that the being which is thought on causes knowledge of itself insofar as it is a being which is thought on (that is, insofar as it is a being related to the first being), and so to conceive it under that idea is not to conceive it under an absolute idea, but under an idea related to the first being; but the relation has to cause in the intellect a correlative concept, or a concept of the corresponding relation -and although the corresponding relation is not conceived of ‘as subsisting in itself’, yet it will be conceived in some way by virtue of the foundation of that relation.⁵⁰

53. Against this argument [n.51] the fact seems to stand that, if there is anything adequate to the object, the one naturally knowable and intelligible to us (whatever way it is present to our intellect), it can cause a concept of itself and of the things that it essentially or virtually includes, and, according to what was already said [n.51], it in no way includes the absolute that is the foundation of the relation in God, as I will prove [nn.54-55]; therefore it follows that in no way is a concept of that absolute caused in us, and so we will not naturally be able to have any concept of anything absolute about God.

54. Proof of the assumption [n.53], - because although the said response [n.52] supposes that a relation in creatures is naturally first conceived before the relation corresponding to it, or before the foundation of the corresponding relation (which I believe to be dubious, because the term of a relation is naturally pre-understood to the relation, just as the foundation is too), - although it supposes too that a created thought-on thing is not understood by us save insofar as it is related (which was refuted in distinction 3 in the question ‘On the Footprint’ [I d.3 nn.310-323] and seems to be against Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.4 n.9: “Each thing subsists to itself, - how much more God?” - and Augustine is speaking about subsistence as about that by which a created thing naturally is not, and which naturally subsists in itself, otherwise the remark, ‘if each thing subsists to itself, how much more God’, would, if the same thing were taken in the premises as in the conclusion, not be an argument), - omitting these things, I say, which perhaps would be denied by the adversary, I argue as follows: although relation in a creature is able, by its virtue, to cause a concept of the relation corresponding to itself, yet that corresponding relation does not include in itself some absolute concept on which it is founded, because the relation of a creature - conversely - to God, which is only one of reason, does not include the divine essence or any perfection absolute in God (which perfection it naturally is), which essence, however, or perfection must be set down as the foundation of the relation of God to creatures; and so there could not, by these relations, be caused in us any concept of absolute perfection unless another relation possessed in itself virtually that absolute which is the proper perfection of God, and that is impossible.

55. This point [sc. that nothing absolute is included in the concept we have of God] is also proved by the fact that, according to them [sc. those holding the opinion in n.53], the divine essence is of a nature only to cause, about itself, a single concept in the intellect, - therefore only a single real concept about it is of a nature to be possessed. The proof of this consequence is that the divine nature itself is of a nature to cause in the intellect every real concept that is, as to its simple understanding, of a nature to be possessed about it (and more imperfect objects are not capable of this). I infer further: therefore any object that is of a nature to cause, about itself, some real concept, is of a nature to cause that single concept which is itself of a nature to be possessed about it -and, if it does not cause that concept, then it causes no concept about it; but no creature can cause that single concept, because then the concept could, under the idea in which it is a singular essence, be understood from creatures; therefore through no creature -according to this position [n.53] - can any singular concept be possessed about the divine essence.

56. [Second reason] - The second reason, touched on in the aforesaid question [I d.3 n.35, 27], was about one certain concept and two doubtful ones, where the certain concept is common to them.⁵¹

57. To this there is a threefold response.⁵² - First, that there is some concept one and the same that is ‘certain’ and ‘doubtful’; as the concept of Socrates and Plato is doubtful while the concept of some man is certain, - and yet both this and that concept are the same.

58. This is nothing, because although the same concept might be diversified in grammatical and logical modes (grammatical ones as in any modes of signifying; logical ones as in any diverse modes of conceiving, as universal and singular, or explicitly or implicitly: explicitly, as definition expresses it - implicitly as the defined thing expresses it), and not only could one posit certitude and incertitude by these differences, but also truth and falsehood, congruity and incongruity, - yet the fact that the same concept, conceived or taken in the same way, may be certain and doubtful according to, or as to, the modes mentioned, is altogether the same as to affirm and deny. Therefore if the concept of being is certain and the concept of created and uncreated being is doubtful (and this is not because of grammatical modes of signifying, nor is it in logical modes of conceiving), then either the concepts will be simply other, which is the intended proposition - or there will be a concept diversified in mode of conceiving universal and particular, which is also the intended proposition.

59. In a second way it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that they are two concepts close to each other, but that also, because of their closeness, they seem to be one concept - and the concept about the ‘one’ seems to be certain, that is, about these two concepts when doubtfully conceived, while doubtful about the two concepts when distinctly conceived.

60. On the contrary. When there are concepts that cannot be conceived under any unity unless they are at the same time, or beforehand, conceived under a distinction proper to them, which distinction is presupposed to the unity, the intellect cannot be certain about them insofar as they have that unity and doubtful about them insofar as they are distinct; or thus: the intellect cannot be certain about the unity of them and doubtful about their distinction; or thus: the intellect cannot be certain about them under the idea of the unity and doubtful about hem under the idea of some proper distinction. But the intellect conceiving the being that is said of God and creatures - if they be two concepts, it cannot have those concepts according to any unity unless it naturally have them first, or at the same time, under their idea as distinct; therefore it cannot be certain about them under the idea of them as one and doubtful about them under the idea of them as many.

61. Proof of the major [n.60], that if there was certitude about any concept (or about all concepts whatever) while there was a doubting about a and b (or along with doubt about a and b), then this one concept or these two concepts [sc. which seem to be one] are conceived first naturally - under the idea under which there is certitude about it or about them - before a and b are conceived [sc. but this is false].⁵³

62. However it is conceded that concepts that have a relation are pre-conceived. -On the contrary. Either conceived as altogether disparate, - therefore they do not ‘seem’ one; or conceived as having some unity, or any unity, of order or distinction among themselves, - and then comes the proof of the minor [n.60]: being in God and being in creatures, if they are two concepts having attribution, cannot be conceived insofar as they have unity of attribution unless this concept and that are first - or at least at the same time - naturally conceived insofar as they are distinct, to wit this concept under its own proper idea and that one under its own proper idea, because these concepts under their own proper ideas are the foundations of the unity of ‘order’ or of ‘attribution’.

63. This is confirmed by an argument of the Philosopher On the Soul 2.2.426b8-15 about the common sense, which sense he concludes is common through its knowledge of the difference between white and black, from the knowledge of which difference he concludes that it knows the extremes. For if it could know them under the idea of this respect which is ‘difference’, without knowing them under their proper idea, then his argument would not be valid. Therefore likewise in the intended proposition, a and b cannot be known at the same time under the idea of this relation - namely of the unity of order - unless a is known under its own proper idea and b under its own proper idea (since for you there is nothing common between them), and so any intellect that conceives these two under the unity of order conceives them as in themselves distinct.

64. A better argument is as follows, against the claim ‘they seem to be one concept’ [n.59]:

Two simply simple concepts are not in the intellect unless each is there distinctly, because such a simply simple concept is either altogether unknown or totally attained (Metaphysics 9.10.1051b17-26); therefore no intellect is certain about it in some respect and doubtful or deceived about it in another. Form, then, a reasoning as follows: an intellect has two concepts; therefore, if ‘they seem’ to be one, something is plain to the intellect about each concept, and something else is not plain -clearly - otherwise they would always seem ‘one’; therefore neither concept is simply simple, therefore they are not first diverse or most abstract.

65. Again, an intellect in possession of a distinct concept can distinguish by it ‘a known object’ from the concept which it has; here [n.59] it cannot distinguish because it does not have a distinct concept, - therefore neither does it have a proper concept, because a proper concept is a concept that is repugnant to another one; therefore the intellect conceiving this proper concept conceives a something that is repugnant to another concept; for example, sight does not see something repugnant to black without thereby distinguishing it from black. I call concepts formal objects. - For because two objects under their proper ideas (one of which is diverse first from the other) are understood by me, and yet I cannot distinguish what this one is, then I do not understand their proper ideas; therefore I understand nothing or I understand something common.

66. Again, when it is know ‘if a thing exists’, the question ‘what it is’ remains, Posterior Analytics 2.1.89b34.⁵⁴

67. Again there is a more brief argument thus: when the intellect is certain, either it is certain about a concept simply one, or it is not but about a concept one ‘by unity of analogy’. If in the first way, and the intellect is not certain about this concept or about that one (because it is in doubt about each in particular), then it is certain about some third concept that is simply one, which is the intended proposition. If in the second way, it is true, insofar as it is thus one concept, - but about that which is thus one I argue: the intellect cannot be certain about something one ‘by unity of analogy’ unless it is certain about the two as they are two; therefore those two do not seem to the intellect to be ‘one’, because they are at once conceived as distinct concepts.

68. The response in the third way [nn.57, 59] is that there is not certitude about some one concept and doubt about two, but certitude about two concepts and doubt about one or other of them; as for example, ‘I am certain that this is a being, that is, that it is a substance or an accident, but I doubt whether it is determinately this being, as substance, or that being, which is accident.’

69. On the contrary. The certitude precedes all apprehension of anything whatever that divides being itself, therefore it precedes certitude ‘about the whole disjunct’. - The proof of the antecedent is that in the first apprehension by which ‘this’ is known to be something, or a being, there is no need to apprehend it from itself or from another, in itself or in another, and so on about other disjuncts.

70. [Third reason, nn.51, 56] - Against this opinion [n.44] there is also a confirmation for the fourth argument stated above [point (d) in footnote to n.51], which was about the inquiry of the intellect, which inquiry we make by natural investigation about God [I d.3 n.39]; here the ideas of creatures that state imperfection of themselves are separated by us from the imperfection with which they exist in creatures, and we consider them, taken in themselves, as indifferent, and we attribute to them supreme perfection; and, when thus taken as supreme, we attribute them to the Creator as proper to him.

71. Thus does Augustine argue On the Trinity XV ch.4 n.6: “Since we put the Creator without any doubt before created things, he must both supremely live, and perceive and understand all things.” This he himself proves from the fact that “we judge that living things are to be preferred to non-living ones, things endowed with sense to non-sentient ones, intelligent things to non-intelligent ones, immortal things to mortal ones,” - which argument does not seem valid if such things, as they are displayed in creatures, were not of the same idea as those which, when such in supreme degree, we attribute to God.

72. The like arguments [sc. taking creaturely imperfection away and attributing supreme perfection to God, n.71] are frequently made or held by the doctors and saints.

For thus are intellect and will posited formally in God, and not only absolutely but along with infinity, - thus too power and wisdom; thus is free choice posited in him; and Anselm On Free Choice ch.1 blames the definition that says free choice ‘is the power of sinning’, because according to him free choice would then - according to this definition -not exist in God, which is false; and this refutation would be no refutation if free choice were said of God and creatures according to a wholly different idea.

73. This is also the way of Dionysius [On the Divine Names ch.7 sect.3, ch.2 sect.7], because when by the third way, or on the third level, he has come to the

‘knowledge by remotion’ [n.49], I ask whether the negation is understood there precisely, - and then God is not more known than a chimaera is, because the negation is common to being and non-being; or whether something positive is known there to which the negation is attributed, - and then about that positive thing I ask how the concept of it is possessed in the intellect; if no concept by way of causality and eminence is possessed, previously caused in the intellect, nothing positive at all will be known to which the negation may be attributed.

74. There is a conformation for this reason [n.70], that we do not say that God is formally a stone but we do say that he is formally wise; and yet if the attribution of concept to concept is precisely considered, stone could be formally attributed to something in God - as to his idea - just like wisdom is.

75. The response is that God is not called wise because the idea of wisdom is in him, but because such a perfection simply is in him, although of a different idea from created wisdom.

On the contrary:

76. Our wisdom is a certain participation in the ‘wisdom in God’, and likewise also in the idea; but only some single same perfection participates essentially.

77. Again, the relation of what participates the idea to the idea is the relation of measured to measure; but a single measured is referred only to a single measure, - the idea is its measure; therefore since the wisdom by which God is wise is the measure of the same, it is not distinguished from the idea (response: the idea is the proper measure and the proper participated, or rather, is the relation of measure and participated, -wisdom is not thus but is the foundation of the relation of measure and participated, and is common, not proper, because one creature participates the perfection in just the way another does).

78. And similarly, if you say that we conclude something about God by reason of effects, where proportion alone and not likeness is sufficient - this does not reply to, but confirms, the argument [n.70], because, by considering God under the idea of cause, he is from creatures known proportionally well enough, but in this way there is not known about God any perfect thing’s perfection that is in creatures formally, but only causally, namely that God is cause of such perfection. But attributes are perfections stated simply of God formally - therefore such attributes are known about God not only by way of proportion but also by way of likeness, such that it is necessary to posit some concept in such attributes common to God and creatures, and the common concept in the first way, knowing God by way of causality, is not of this sort.

79. For this argument [n.70] there is the authority of the Philosopher Metaphysics 2.1.993b23-29, who, when arguing that ‘the principles of eternal things are most true’, proves it through this major, that ‘that thing is in each case maximally such whereby univocity is predicated in other things’, and he exemplifies it about fire; and from this he concludes that ‘the principles of eternal things must be most true’. This consequence is not valid save in virtue of the following minor, that the eternal principles ‘are the univocal cause of truth in other things’. For if in the minor the proposition is taken that the principles are equivocal or analogical, there will be four terms in the Philosopher’s syllogism, which is not likely.

C. To the Arguments for the Opinion

80. To the arguments for the opposite opinion [n.44].

To the first [n.45]. Either one understands in the minor the ‘they are totally under the extremes of a contradiction’, that is, that they are precisely under the extremes of a contradiction, - and thus the minor is false; for God is not precisely the extreme ‘not from another’, because this negation is said of a chimaera, nor is a creature precisely the negation ‘not a necessary being’, because this belongs to a chimaera, - but both God and a creature are something to which one or other side of a contradiction belongs. Take the major then to mean that whatever things are of the sort that the extremes of a contradiction belong to them, that ‘these things are not univocally spoken of in anything’; this major is false, for all things that per se divide something common are of the sort that the extremes of a contradiction are said of them, and yet they are univocally spoken of in that division. So in the intended proposition: these things can all receive, according to themselves, the predication of a contradiction, and yet they can have something abstract -or some substrate of the extremes of the contradiction - which is common to both [sc. extremes].

81. As to the confirmation about the ‘neutral’ [n.46], I say that even a concept common to two things is neutral formally, and so I concede the conclusion that the concept of being is not formally the concept of something created or of something uncreated [I d.3 n.27]; but if the understanding be that this concept is neutral such that neither of the contradictories is said of it, it is false. For thus it is about rational and irrational, that the concept animal is formally neutral with respect to them, and yet that which is conceived is not neutral but is truly one or other of them. For one or other of the contradictories is said of any animal whatever, and yet it is not necessary that any concept whatever is formally one or other of the contradictories.

82. As to the third [n.47] the answer will be plain in the third article ‘that God and creatures are not diverse first in their concepts’ [nn.95-127]; they are, however, diverse first in reality, because they agree in no reality - and how there can be a common concept without agreement in thing or in reality will be said in what follows [nn.137-150].

83. To the next one, about attribution [n.48], I say that attribution by itself does not posit unity, because the unity of attribution is less than the unity of univocity, and the lesser does not include the greater; yet a lesser unity can stand along with a greater unity, just as things that are one in genus are one in species, although the unity of a genus is less than the unity of a species. So here, I concede that the unity of attribution does not posit unity of univocity, and yet this unity of attribution stands along with unity of univocity, although this unity is not formally that unity, example: the species of the same genus have an essential attribution to the first thing of that genus (Metaphysics 10.1.1052b18), and yet there stands along with this the unity of univocity of idea in those species. Thus -and much more so - must it be in the proposed case, that the attributes may have in idea of being, in which there is unity of attribution, a unity of univocity, because never are things compared as measured to measure, or as exceeded to exceeding, unless they agree in some one thing. But just as comparison simply is in the univocal simply (Physics 7.4.248b6-7), so any comparison is in what is somehow or other univocal. For when it is said ‘this is more perfect than that’, if it is asked ‘a more perfect what?’, one must assign something common to both, so that the determinable of every comparative is common to each extreme of the comparison; for a man is not a more perfect man than an ass, but is a more perfect animal. And so, if certain things are compared in being, where there is attribution of one to the other (‘this is more perfect than that; a more perfect what? - a more perfect being’), there must be a unity in some way common to each extreme.

84. Thus may it also be argued about number or about distinction, because all distinct or numbered things have something common, as Augustine means in On the Trinity VII ch.4 n.7: “If three persons are spoken of, common to them is what a person is,” - so that the determinable of a numerable term is always something common (according to Augustine) to all the numbered things. - And if it be instanced that there is properly no number of God and creatures, I argue about the diverse or the distinct or the other, thus: God and a creature are diverse or distinct, or God is something, or someone, other than a creature. In all these cases the determinable of the distinction, or of the stated singularity or plurality, must be common to each extreme - the point is plain in all examples, because a man is not ‘another man than an ass’ but ‘another animal’. This is proved by reason, because in relations of equal comparison the extremes are of the same idea; otherness is such a relation; therefore in all things ‘other’ there is an otherness of the same idea, and consequently the determinable of otherness will be of one idea. Do not rely on this, because it would conclude that the foundation is of the same idea, hence the minor [‘otherness is such a relation’] is contrary to the article about ‘other’.⁵⁵

85. As for the argument from Dionysius [n.49], it is clear rather in the third argument [n.73] that the intention of Dionysius is to the opposite, because at the third level a stand is not made at negation alone, but at some concept taken from creatures, to which that negation is attributed.

86. To Augustine [n.50] I reply that ‘the good by participation in which other things are good’ (which good is understood by understanding this good and that) can either be posited as a universal to all goods, and then ‘the other goods’ are by participation in it (the way a species participates the genus, or as any inferior participates the superior), or it can be understood as the good in essence, by participation in which, as in their cause, the other goods are, and then it is true that, by understanding this good and that good, I understand the good in essence, but in the case of the universal I understand good the way that, when understanding this being, I understand being as part of its concept, and that in being I understand any being whatever universally. And when Augustine adds ‘if you can know it in itself’ [n.50], I say that if the ‘in itself’ is referred, not to the act of knowing, but to the object [sc. if ‘in itself’ goes with ‘it’ not with ‘know’], - to wit, that I know the good, which I know universally, with the determination ‘in itself’, namely that I conceive the good with the sort of determination that it is a nondependent good and good in essence - then I understand God not only in a common concept but in a proper concept, and then, by the phrase ‘in itself’, the good that was common is contracted and becomes proper to God; and beatitude lies in cleaving to this good by enjoyment (speaking of the beatitude of the way [sc. as opposed to the beatitude of the heavenly fatherland]), because this concept is the most perfect we can have in conceiving God naturally.

87. And this appears to be the intention of Augustine in On Free Choice of the Will II chs.8-14 nn.23-28 - or elsewhere in the same book [On the Trinity VIII, n.50], where he says: “do not look for what truth is, because at once phantasms will present themselves, etc.;” which would not be true if there was a concept of being or of good in God altogether different from the concept of them in creatures. For then one well ought to look for ‘what truth is’, because then a truth would be looked for that is proper to God, nor would phantasms there present themselves to disturb the concept of truth as it is proper to God, because this concept does not have concepts corresponding to it. But they do disturb the concept of truth as it belongs to God when speaking of truth universally, as has been expounded elsewhere [I d.3 n.193].

But there are some who shamelessly insist that there is one concept of being and yet none that is univocal to this thing and that, - this is not to the intention of this question, because, whatever it is that is conceived according to attribution or order in diverse things, yet if there is a concept of itself one, such that it does not have a different idea according as it is said of this and of that, that concept is univocal.

89. Also if anyone in any way shamelessly insists that a denominative concept is not univocal, because the idea of the subject is not of the idea of the predicate, - this instance seems puerile, because in one way a denominative predicate is a middle between a univocal and an equivocal predicate, in another an equivocal and a univocal predicate are, in logic, immediate [extremes]. The first is true when taking a univocal predicate which is univocally predicated, that is because, namely, its idea is the idea of the subject, and in this way a denominative predicate is not univocal. The second is true when understanding it of the unity of the idea which is predicated; thus a univocal concept is that whose idea is in itself one, or the idea is the idea of the subject, whether it denominates the subject or is said per accidens of the subject, but an equivocal concept is that whose idea is different, however that idea is disposed to the subject. An example: animal is univocal, not only as said of its species but also as determined by its differences, because it has one concept determinable by them, and yet it is not said univocally of the differences, such that it is predicated in their ‘what’ - such that its idea is the idea of the differences, the way it is said of the species. Also, this dispute is nothing to the purpose, because if being is said about God and creatures according to a single concept of itself, one must say that the idea of being is the idea of the subject; for it will be said of both in the ‘what’, and so it will be univocal in both ways.

II. Second Opinion

90. The other opinion is affirmative, at the other extreme [n.44], which posits that God is in a genus - and they [sc. those who hold this opinion]⁵⁶ have also on their behalf the authority of Damascene Elementary Instruction on Dogmas ch.7: “Incorporeal substance etc.”⁵⁷

91. Again Boethius in his little book On the Trinity ch.4, where he seems to say that two genera ⁵⁸ remain in divine reality. This cannot be understood only according to some similar mode of predicating, because Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.5 n.8 speaks thus: “If God be called good, just, spirit” etc ., “only the last one I mentioned seems to signify substance, and the rest qualities;” and On the Trinity V ch.8 n.9 he seems to say that action most properly agrees with God. Therefore it is not merely the modes of predicating similar to those genera that remain, and in this way does it seem one should understand Boethius ‘about those two genera’ that in themselves remain.

92. Third for this opinion seems to be the authority of Averroes Metaphysics X com.7 (and the text begins “And being is said”),Cf. Scotus’ Lectura I d.8 n.92. ⁵⁹ where the Philosopher says that “there is some one first substance,” which is the measure of the others [Metaphysics 10.2.1054a8-9, 11-13]. The Commentator wants this first substance to be the prime mover. Therefore, just as in the case of other genera the ‘first’ is something of that genus, so the first mover is something of the genus of substance.

93. A first reason set down for this opinion is of the following sort, that created substance can be conceived from uncreated substance, and that neither concept is simply simple. Therefore, by resolution, the idea of substance will remain, indifferent to each contracting instance - and the idea of genus seems to be thus indifferently taken.⁶⁰

94. A second reason is that many simple entities are placed in a genus, such as angels, according to those who posit them to be immaterial - accidents too, according to those who posit them to be simple. Therefore the simplicity of God does not exclude from him the idea of genus.

III. Scotus’ own Opinion

95. I hold a middle opinion, that along with the simplicity of God stands the fact that some concept is common to him and to creatures - not however some common concept as of a genus, because the concept is not said of God in the ‘what’, nor is it, by whatever formal predication said of him, per se in any genus.

A. Proof of the First Part of the Opinion

96. The first part was proved when arguing against the first opinion [nn.44, 51-79].

B. Proof of the Second Part of the Opinion

1. By the Reasons of Augustine and Avicenna

97. The second part I prove by Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.5 n.10: “It is manifest that God is improperly called a ‘substance’.” - His reason there is that substance is said to be that which stands under the accidents; but it is absurd to say that God stands under any accident; therefore etc . This reason holds in this way: Augustine does not understand that the idea of substance is ‘to stand under accidents as substance is a genus’, because he has given there as premise that “it is absurd that substance be said relatively.” But substance, as it is a genus, is limited, as will be immediately proved next [nn.101-107]; but every limited substance is able to receive an accident; therefore any substance that is in a genus can stand under some accident, - God does not so stand, therefore etc .

98. Again, Avicenna Metaphysics VIII ch.4 (99rb) argues that God is not in a genus, because a genus is a ‘part’; but God is simple, not possessing part and part; therefore God is not in a genus.

99. These two reasons [nn.97-98] are true by authority and reason together.

2. By what is Proper to God

100. I now show the intended proposition [n.95] by two middle terms (and they are made clear from things proper to God): first from the idea of infinity, - second from the idea of necessary existence.

101. [From the idea of infinity] - From the first I argue in two ways.

First as follows: a concept having an indifference to certain things to which the concept of a genus cannot be indifferent cannot be the concept of a genus; but something commonly said of God and creatures is indifferent to the finite and infinite, speaking of essential features, - or at any rate indifferent to the finite and non-finite, speaking of any feature whatever, because divine relation is not finite; no genus can be indifferent to the finite and infinite, therefore etc .⁶¹

102. The first part of the minor is plain, because whatever is an essential perfection in God is formally infinite, - in creatures it is finite.

103. I prove the second part of the minor by the fact that a genus is taken from some reality which, in itself, is potential to the reality from which the difference is taken; nothing infinite is potential to anything, as is plain from what was said in the preceding question.⁶² This proof stands on the composition of species and the potentiality of genus, but both these are removed from God, because of infinity.

104. This assumption [n.103] is plain from the authority of Aristotle Metaphysics 8.3.1043b25-26: “The term” (that is, the definition) “must be an extended proposition,” “because of the fact that it signifies something of something, so that the latter is matter and the former is form.”See Appendix to this question point D. ⁶³

105. The same assumption is also apparent by reason, because if the reality from which the genus is taken were truly the whole quiddity of the thing, the genus alone would completely define it, - also genus and difference would not define it, because the account composed of them would not indicate what is first the same as the thing defined; for each thing is itself once, and therefore an account that would express it twice would not indicate what is first the same as the quiddity of the thing.

106. Treating further in some way of this reasoning [n.105], I understand it thus, that genus and difference are, in the case of some creatures, taken from one and another reality (as, by positing there to be several forms in man, animal is taken from the sensitive form and rational from the intellective form), and then the thing from which the genus is taken is truly potential and perfectible by the thing from which the difference is taken. Sometimes, when there is not there thing and thing (as in the case of accidents), at any rate there is in the one thing some reality from which the genus is taken and another reality from which the difference is taken; let the first be called a and the second b; a is in itself potential to b, so that, by understanding a precisely and b precisely, in the way a is understood in the first instant of nature - the instant in which it is precisely itself - it is perfectible by b (as if it were another thing), but the fact that it is not perfected really by b is because of the identity of a and b with some whole with which they are first really the same, and this whole is indeed what is first produced and in this very whole both those realities are produced; but if either of them were produced without the other, it would be truly potential to it and truly imperfect without it.

107. This composition of realities - of potential and actual - is the least that is sufficient for the idea of genus and difference, and it does not stand along with the fact that some reality is infinite in something; for if the reality were of itself infinite, however much it is precisely taken, it would not be in potency to any reality; therefore since in God any essential reality is formally infinite, there is none from which the idea of genus can formally be taken.

108. [Again from the idea of infinity] - Second, from the same middle [n.100], I argue as follows: the concept of a species is not only the concept of a reality and of a mode intrinsic to the same reality, because then whiteness would be a genus and the degrees of intrinsic whiteness could be the specific differences;⁶⁴ but those things by which something common is contracted to God and creatures are the finite and infinite, which state intrinsic degrees of it;⁶⁵ therefore the contracting things cannot be the differences, nor do they constitute with the contracted thing a composite composed in the way the concept of a species should be composed, nay the concept from such a contracted and contracting thing is simpler than the concept of a species could be.⁶⁶

109. From these middles about infinity, the reasoning of Augustine stated above about ‘standing under the accidents’ [n.97] gets its evidence. Thence too does Avicenna’s reasoning get its evidence, in Metaphysics VIII ‘about the partial nature of genus’ touched on above [n.98], because a genus is never without some partial reality in the species, which reality cannot be in something really simple.

110. [From the idea of necessary existence] - I argue, third, from the second middle, namely from the idea of necessary existence [n.100], - and it is the argument of Avicenna Metaphysics VIII ch.4 (99rb): if necessary existence has a genus, then the intention of the genus will either be from necessary existence or not. If in the first way, “then it will only cease at the difference;” I understand this as follows: the genus will in that case include the difference, because without it the genus is not in ultimate act and ‘necessary existence of itself’ is in ultimate act (but if the genus includes the difference, then it is not the genus). If the second way be granted, then it follows that “necessary existence will be constituted by that which is not necessary existence.”⁶⁷

111. But this reasoning [n.110] proves that necessary existence has nothing common with anything, because the common intention is ‘non-necessary existence’; hence I respond: the intention as understood includes neither necessity nor possibility, but is indifferent; but as to that in the thing which corresponds to the intention, it is in ‘this thing’ necessary existence, and in ‘that thing’ it is possible existence (this is rejected if to the intention of the genus a proper reality corresponds, and if it does not thus correspond to the common intention, - as is said [later, n.139].

112. [As to ‘whatever is said formally of God’] - As to that which is added in the question ‘about whatever is formally said of God’ [n.39], I say nothing such is in a genus,⁶⁸ for the same reason [nn.95-111], that nothing which is limited is said formally of God; whatever is of some genus, in whatever way it is of that genus, is necessarily limited.

113. But then there is a doubt, as to what sort the predicates are which are said of God, such as wise, good, etc .

I reply. Being is divided first into finite and infinite before it is divided into the ten categories, because one of them, namely ‘finite’, is common to these ten genera; therefore anything that agrees with being as indifferent to the finite and infinite, or as proper to infinite being, agrees with being, not as it is determined to a genus, but as prior, and consequently as it is transcendent and outside every genus. Anything that is common to God and creatures is such as to agree with being as indifferent to the finite and infinite; for as it agrees with God it is infinite, - as it agrees with creatures, it is finite; therefore it agrees with being before being is divided into the ten genera, and consequently whatever is such is transcendent.

114. But then there is another doubt, as to how ‘wisdom’ is set down as transcendent although it is not common to all beings.

I reply. Just as the idea of ‘most general’ is not the having of several species under it but the not having any genus above it (just as this category ‘when’ - because it does not have a genus above it - is most general, although it has few or no species), so the transcendent is whatever has no genus under which it is contained. Hence it is of the idea of the transcendent to have no predicate above it save being; but the fact it is common to many inferiors is accidental to it.

115. This is plain from another fact, that being not only has simple properties convertible with it, - as one, true, good - but also it has some properties where there are opposites distinguished against each other, as necessary existence or possible existence, act or potency, and the like. But just as the convertible properties are transcendent, because they follow being insofar as it is not determined to any genus, so the disjunct properties are transcendent, and each member of the disjunct is transcendent because neither determines its determinable to a definite genus; and yet one member of the disjunct is formally specific, agreeing with only one being, - as necessary existence in this division ‘necessary existence or possible existence’, and as infinite in this division ‘finite or infinite’, and so on in other cases. Thus too can wisdom be transcendent, and anything else that is common to God and creatures, although some such be said of God only, and some other such be said of God and a creature. But it is not necessary that a transcendent, as transcendent, be said only of whatever being is convertible with the first transcendent, namely with being.⁶⁹

3. Statement and Refutation of Some People’s Proof

116. [Some people’s proof] - Some people Aquinas On Power q.7 a.3. ⁷⁰ prove it in a fourth way [nn.101, 108, 110], that God is not a genus because “he contains in himself the perfections of all genera.”⁷¹

[Refutation of the proof] - But this argument is not valid, because what contains something contains it in its own way. Substance too, which is now the most general genus, contains, as it is taken for all inferior species, all the accidents virtually; so that, if God were to cause only the individuals of substances, they would have in themselves the wherewithal to cause all accidents, and yet created substances would not be denied, because of this, to be in a genus, because they contain accidents virtually in their own way and not in the way of accidents. So, therefore, from the fact alone that God contains the perfections of all genera, it does not follow that he is not in a genus, because containing them in this way does not exclude finitude (for this ‘to contain virtually’ is not ‘to be infinite’), but from God’s absolute infinity this does follow, as was deduced before [nn.101-109].

117. [Instances from infinite line] - But against this [sc. the last clause of n.118] an instance is made that infinity simply does not prove the intended proposition [sc. that God is not in a genus], because the Philosopher Topics 6.11.148b23-32 takes exception to the definition of straight line (namely this definition, ‘a straight line is that whose middle does not extend outside the extremes’), for this reason, that if there were an infinite line it could be straight, - but then it would not have a middle, nor extremes or ends; but a definition is not to be taken exception to because it does not agree with that to which being in a genus is incompossible; therefore it is not incompossible for an infinite line to be in a genus, and consequently infinity does not necessarily prohibit being in a genus.⁷²

118. I reply, first to the intention of the authority [sc. of Aristotle, n.117], -because a straight line is a whole per accidens, and, if this whole be defined, it will be assigned one definition corresponding to line and another corresponding to straight. That which corresponds to ‘straight’ in the place in the definition does not formally contradict the infinite (because straight does not formally contradict the infinite), and what a definition is formally repugnant to, the thing defined will also be repugnant to; but that there is assigned in the definition, which the Philosopher takes exception to, a definition as it were of straight (that is, to have a mean within the extremes), this is formally repugnant to the infinite; therefore, if this definition were good, it has to be that straight would be formally repugnant to the infinite, - but this is false, although straight is, as to its subject, formally repugnant to the infinite. The Philosopher, then, does not intend to say that an infinite line can be in a genus, but that infinity is not formally repugnant to the idea of straight, - and therefore the definition to which infinity is formally repugnant is not a definition ‘of straight insofar as it is straight’; for he would not have taken exception to this definition ‘a straight line is length without breadth, whose extremes are two points equally extended’, because here something would be repugnant to infinity, but it would assigned as the idea of line, not as the idea of straight, - and then it would be well assigned because infinity is repugnant to that line.

119. But there is another doubt, concerning the thing, whether an infinite straight line could be in the genus of quantity, - and if it could, then the two reasons taken from infinity [nn.101, 108] do not seem to be valid.

I reply. Never does the supreme in a superior follow on the supreme in an inferior unless the inferior is the most noble thing contained under the superior, just as ‘the most perfect ass, therefore the most perfect animal’ does not follow, but ‘the most perfect man, therefore the most perfect animal’ does, thanks to the matter, follow, because man is the most perfect of animals; therefore the best or most perfect being does not follow on the most perfect of the things that are contained under being unless it is the simply most perfect thing contained under being; but quantity is not such, nor anything in that genus -because anything in it is limited - nay, nothing is such save what is perfection simply, which can of itself be infinite; and so ‘the most perfect quantity, therefore the most perfect being’ does not follow, nor does it thus follow about anything in any genus, but only this follows, ‘the most perfect truth or goodness, therefore the most perfect being’. So it is, then, with the infinite, that because it does not assert only supreme perfection but also a perfection that cannot be exceeded, infinite being does not follow save on such an infinite as is the most perfect thing in which there is the idea of being, namely which asserts perfection simply. And therefore, although there were a quantity infinite in idea of quantity, yet, since quantity is not a perfection simply, it would not follow that it was an infinite being, because it would not follow that it was a being which could not be exceeded in perfection. There might, then, be an infinite line in the genus of quantity, because it would be a simply limited being and exceeded simply by a simply more perfect being, but ‘an infinite being simply’ cannot exist in a genus; and the reason is that the first infinite [sc. that of a line] does not take away all the potentiality that the idea of genus requires, but it only posits an infinity in a certain respect of some imperfect entity (in which, as it is that thing, there can well be composition, in whatever degree it be put -

as long as it is that thing), but the second infinity necessarily takes away [that potentiality], as was made clear before [nn.106-107, 103].

120. [Instance from the insufficiency of the categories of Aristotle] - Against this [n.119] it is opposed that then contradictories would be posited, by conceding a common concept said in the ‘what’ about God and creatures and denying that God is in a genus; for every concept said in the ‘what’, if it is a common concept, is either the concept of a genus or the concept of a definition, otherwise there will be more predicates than Aristotle taught in Topics 1.4.101b15-28.⁷³

121. To this I say that they are not contradictories. The thing is plain from the authorities of Augustine given above [n.97], - where he denies that God is a substance and concedes that properly and even truly he is essence. But if there were a different, an equivocal, concept for essence as essence belongs to God and creatures, then there could thus be an equivocal concept of substance, - and so God could then be called substance just as he is called essence.

122. Likewise Avicenna in Metaphysics VIII ch.4 (99rb), where he denies that God is in a genus, concedes there that he is substance and being not in another. And that he is taking ‘being’ non-equivocally from the concept according to which it is said of creatures appears from himself in Metaphysics I ch.2 (71ra), where he says that “being in itself does not have principles, which is why science does not look for the principles of being absolutely, but of some being.” But if being had a different concept in God and in creatures, there could well be a principle in itself of being, because of being according to one concept being itself according to another concept would be the principle.

123. When you argue ‘it is said in the ‘what’, then it is genus or definition’ [n.120], - I reply: Aristotle Metaphysics 8.3.1043b23-32 teaches what sort of ‘predicate said in the what’ is a definition. For he introduces there, against the ‘ideas’ of Plato the sayings of the followers of Antisthenes, - whom to this extent he approves when they say, “a long account is a term.” And afterwards he adds that “it is a feature of substance that of it there can be a term (to wit of composite substance, whether sensible or intelligible), but of the first elements from which these are, there is not” (supply, a definition), - and he adds the reason: “since a definition signifies something of something” (this needs to be understood virtually, not formally, - as was said elsewhere [I d.3 n.147]); and he adds: “this indeed must be as matter, but that as form.” From which he seems there to be arguing that the [Platonic] ‘idea’, if it were posited, would not be definable, and so if, because of the simplicity of the ‘idea’, his own reasoning has validity in any way, he himself would much more deny a definition of God, whose simplicity is supreme. Therefore it follows from his authority that nothing is said of God in the ‘what’ as a definition.

124. From the same it follows that nothing is said in the ‘what’ of God as a genus. For whatever has a genus can have a difference and a definition, because (Metaphysics 7.12.1038a5-6) genus ‘either is nothing besides the species, or if it is, it is so indeed as matter’, and then that of which there is a genus should be set down as being able to have a difference as form. If, therefore, something is said of God in the ‘what’, it follows, arguing constructively from Aristotle’s authority not destructively, that that something is not a genus or definition; but when you infer ‘it is a genus or definition, because Aristotle did not say that there were other predicates asserted in the ‘what’, therefore there are no other predicates’ [n.120] - you are arguing from the authority destructively, and there is a fallacy of the consequent.⁷⁴

125. But you will say: then Aristotle did not sufficiently hand on all the predicates said in the ‘what’.

I reply. The Philosopher in the Topics [n.120] distinguished predicates because of the distinction of problems, because diverse problems have, from the diversity of predicates, a diverse way of terminating. So he does not there number all the predicates, because he does not number specific difference (although he did include general difference under genus); and yet specific difference has the proper idea of a predicate; now species too has the proper idea of a predicate, different from definition, otherwise Porphyry [Book of Predicables ch.1] would have been wrong to posit five universals. For that reason, therefore, Aristotle did sufficiently there distinguish the predicates, because he distinguished all those about which puzzling problems require a special way of terminating, which is what he was there intending to hand on. - But the transcendent ones are not such predicates, because there are no special problems about them; for a problem supposes something certain and inquires into what is doubtful (Metaphysics 7.17.1041b4-11), but being and thing “are impressed on the soul in first impression” (Avicenna Metaphysics I ch.6 (72rb)), and therefore about these most common concepts there are no per se terminable problems. It was not necessary, then, to number them among the predicates of problems.

126. But is it really the case that Aristotle never taught those general predicates [sc. the transcendent ones]?

I reply. In Metaphysics 8 [n.123] he taught that nothing was said of God as genus (from the afore-mentioned authority [n.123]), and yet he did teach that ‘truth’ is said univocally of God and creatures in Metaphysics 2.1.993b30-31, as was mentioned above (where he says that ‘the principles of eternal things are most true’ [n.79]); and by this he taught that entity is said univocally of God and creatures, because he adds there (sc. Metaphysics 2, ibid.) that “as each thing is related to being, so is it related to truth;” it is also plain - according to him ⁷⁵ - that if being is said of God, it will be said in the ‘what’. Therefore in these passages he implicitly taught that some transcendent predicate is said in the ‘what’, and that it is not genus or definition, - and that other transcendent predicates are said in the ‘what sort’ (like true), and yet that they are not properties or accidents in accord with the fact that these universals (sc. property and accident) belong to the species of some of the genera, because nothing which is a species of some genus belongs to God in any way.

127. He also in some way taught the same in Topics 4.6.128a38-39: “If something,” - he says - “always follows and does not convert, it is difficult to separate it from being a genus.” And he afterwards adds: “To use it as a genus by the fact that it always follows, although it does not convert,” - as if he were saying that this is expedient for the opponent; and he adds: “when the other grants one of the two sides, one should not obey him in everything,”⁷⁶ - as if he were to say that this is expedient to the respondent, not to concede that every non-convertible consequent is a predicate as a genus; and, if he were not speaking of a predicate said in the ‘what’, there would be no plausibility to what he teaches, that the opponent is using such as a genus. Therefore he insinuates there that something is a common predicate said in a ‘what’ which is not a genus. - And that he is speaking of predication in the ‘what’ is seen from his examples, ‘tranquility is quiet’. For predication in abstract things is not predication in the ‘what sort’ or a denominative predication.

IV. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion

128. To the arguments for the second opinion [nn.90-94]. I respond to Damascene [n.90]. Although he says many words, in diverse places, which seem to say that God is in a genus, yet one word - which he says in Elementary Instruction on Dogmas ch.8 -solves everything. For there he says that “Substance, which contains the uncreated deity super-substantially, but the whole creation cognitively and content-fully, is the most general genus.” Therefore he does not say that the substance which is the most general genus contains the deity as it contains the creature, but contains it ‘super-substantially’, that is, by taking that which is a matter of perfection in substance, as it is a genus, and leaving out that which is a matter of imperfection - in the way Avicenna says in Metaphysics VIII ch.4 [n.122] that God is ‘being in itself’.

129. As to Boethius [n.91] I say that nowhere in that little book is he found to say that ‘two genera remain in divine reality’. In brief, neither genera, nor modes or genera, nor their ideas remain there, - because, just as genera and the things in them are limited, so also are their modes and ideas (speaking of ideas of first intention, which are founded on these), because nothing can be founded on a limited thing save a limited thing.

130. Yet Boethius does - in his little book On the Trinity chs.4, 6 - say, after enumerating the categories, that “if anyone turns these toward divine predication, all that can be changed are changed; but a something is not at all predicated as ‘a relation to something’,” - and later, “essence contains the unity, relation multiplies the trinity;” and from these is taken the thought that he indicates substance and relation remain in divine reality. But he expressly says there that neither substance, which is a genus, nor anything of it, remains there; for he says “When we speak of God, we seem to signify substance, but a substance that is beyond substance,” in the way Damascene spoke of substance ‘super-substantially’ [n.128]. Boethius intends, then, that there are two modes of predicating in divine reality, namely of relative predicate and essential predicate, which modes Augustine expresses rather as ‘to itself’ and ‘to another’ - On the Trinity V ch.8 n.9 - , and all the predicates said formally of God are contained under one or other of these two members; but under the first member [sc. ‘to itself’] are contained many predicates that have a mode of predicating like quality and quantity (and not only those that have a mode of predicating similar to the ones which are of the category of substance), and under the second member [sc. ‘to another’] are contained all that have a mode of predicating similar to relatives, whether they are properly relatives or not.

131. And as to why all essential predicates are said to be predicated according to substance, and why against them are distinguished the predicates said ‘in relation to something’, although however the predicates said ‘in relation to something’ pass over, by identity, into substance, just as the other predicates also do, - the reason for this will be assigned in the following question ‘About attributes’, in the second doubt against the principal solution [nn.215-216, 222].

132. As to Averroes [n.92] I say that he does not seem to have the intention of the master, because Aristotle, in Metaphysics 10.1.1052b18-1053b3, 2.1053b9-1054a19, asks whether in substances there is something one that is the measure of the others, and whether this is the one itself. And he proves - from his intention against Plato - that it is not the one itself, but something to which one itself belongs, just as with all other genera when speaking of one and of the other common things measured in the genera. And he concludes at the end: “Wherefore indeed, in properties and qualities and quantities one itself is something one but not the substance of it; and in substances things must be similarly disposed - for things are similar in everything” (about which text the Commentator set down the words afore mentioned [n.92]). But if the first mover is posited as the measure of the genus itself of substance, this one thing would itself be posited as the measure, because the first mover - on account of its simplicity - would much more truly be this one thing itself than the idea of Plato.

133. What then is the first measure of the genus?

I reply: some substance in that genus, to which unity belongs, is first. - But the first mover is not the intrinsic measure of that genus, just as not of the other genera either. Yet insofar as it is, in some way, the extrinsic measure of everything, it is more immediately the measure of substances, which are more perfect beings, than of accidents, which are more remote from it. It is, however, the intrinsic measure of no genus.

134. To the first reason [n.93] I say that if you contract substance with the difference of created and uncreated, then substance is not taken there as it is the concept of the most general genus (for uncreated is repugnant to substance in this way, because substance in this way involves limitation), but substance is taken there for ‘being in itself’ and not ‘being in another’, whose concept is prior and more common than the concept of substance as it is a genus, - as was plain from Avicenna above [n.122].

135. To the other reason [n.94] I concede that the composition of thing and thing is not required for a being ‘in a genus’, but there is required composition of reality and reality, one of which - precisely taken in the first moment of nature - is in potency to the other and perfectible by the other; but such composition cannot be of infinite reality to infinite reality; but all reality in God is infinite formally, as was made clear above [n.107], - therefore etc .

V. To the Principal Arguments

136. [To the first] - To the first principal argument [n.39] I concede that this concept said of God and creatures in the ‘what’ is contracted by some contracting concepts that assert a ‘what sort’, but it is not the case either that this concept said in the ‘what’ is the concept of a genus, or that those concepts asserting a ‘what sort’ are concepts of differences, because this ‘quidditative’ concept is common to the finite and infinite, which community cannot be in the concept of a genus, - and those contracting concepts assert an intrinsic mode of the contracted thing itself, and not some reality perfecting it; but differences do not assert an intrinsic mode of reality of some genus, because, in whatever grade animality is understood, rationality or irrationality is not on this account an intrinsic mode of animality, but animality is in that grade still understood as perfectible by rationality or irrationality.⁷⁷

137. But there is a doubt how a concept common to God and creatures can be taken as ‘real’ save from some reality of the same genus, - and then it seems that it is potential to the reality from which the distinguishing concept is taken, as was argued before ‘about the concept of genus and difference’ [n.39], and then the argument made above for the first opinion stands, that, if there were some reality in the thing that distinguishes and another reality in it that is distinguished, it seems that the thing is composite, because it has something by which it agrees and something by which it differs [n.47].⁷⁸

138. I reply that when some reality is understood along with its intrinsic mode, the concept is not so simply simple that the reality cannot be conceived without the mode, but it is then an imperfect concept of the thing; the concept can also be conceived under that mode, and it is then a perfect concept of the thing. An example: if there were a whiteness in the tenth grade of perfection, however much it was in every way simple in the thing, it could yet be conceived under the idea of such an amount of whiteness, and then it would be perfectly conceived with a concept adequate to the thing itself, - or it could be conceived precisely under the idea of whiteness, and then it would be conceived with an imperfect concept and one that failed of the perfection of the thing; but an imperfect concept could be common to the whiteness and to some other one, and a perfect concept could be proper.

139. A distinction, then, is required between that from which a common concept is taken and that from which a proper concept is taken, not as a distinction of reality and reality but as a distinction of reality and proper and intrinsic mode of the same, - which distinction suffices for having a perfect or imperfect concept of the same thing, of which concepts the imperfect is common and the perfect is proper. But the concepts of genus and difference require a difference of realities, not just of the same reality perfectly and imperfectly conceived.

140. This point [n.139] can be clarified. If we posit that some intellect is perfectly moved by color to understand the reality of the color and the reality of the difference, however much the intellect may have a perfect concept adequate to the concept of the first reality, it does not have in this concept a concept of the reality from which the difference is taken, nor conversely, - but it has there two formal objects which are of a nature to terminate distinct proper concepts. But if the distinction in the thing were only as of reality and its intrinsic mode, the intellect could not both have a proper concept of the reality and not have a concept of the intrinsic mode of the thing (at any rate as of the mode under which it would be conceived, although this mode itself would not be conceived, just as is elsewhere said ‘about conceived singularity and the mode under which it is conceived’ [I d.2 n.183]), but in the perfect concept it would have one object adequate to it, namely the thing under the mode.⁷⁹

141. And if you say ‘at any rate the common concept is indeterminate and potential with respect to the special concept, therefore the reality too is indeterminate and potential with respect to the reality, or at any rate the concept will not be infinite, because nothing infinite is potential with respect to anything’, - I concede that the concept common to God and creatures is finite, that is, it is not of itself infinite, because, if it were infinite, it would not of itself be common to the finite and infinite; nor is it of itself positively finite, such that it of itself include finitude, because then it would not belong to the infinite, - but it is of itself indifferent to the finite and the infinite; and so it is finite negatively, that is, it does not posit infinity, and in such negative finitude it is determinable through some concept.

142. But if you argue ‘therefore the reality from which it [sc. the above concept] is taken is finite’, - it does not follow; for it is not taken from any reality as a concept adequate to that reality, or as a perfect concept adequate to that reality, but it is diminished and imperfect, to such an extent even that if the reality from which it is taken were to be seen perfectly and intuitively, he who intuits it would not there have distinct formal objects, namely the reality and the mode, but one and the same formal object [n.140], - yet he who understands it with abstractive intellection can, because of the imperfection of the intellection, have it for formal object although he not have the other one.

143. As to the ‘I concede...’ [n.141 near the middle]: the concept is not the finite act [sc. whereby we conceive] but is the formal object [n.65]. If it is determinable [n.141], then it is formally finite and potential, and then not common to an infinite thing.

The final consequence [sc. the clause immediately preceding] is to be denied, because the infinite thing is in the formal finite object understood imperfectly to the extent that the infinite object would be of a nature to cause in the intellect such a formal object if it were to be moving it in diminished fashion [n.142], just as also a created object moving in diminished fashion is of a nature to do the same; and therefore it is common to both, as a sort of common and imperfect likeness.

144. To the contrary: an infinite thing is not anything finite; God is the object in question, if the object is predicated of God in the ‘what’, in the way ‘man is an animal’ -similarly, God is not anything potential.

Response. Although there is in the intellect a composition of concepts, yet the conception is on behalf of the external thing. Just as signs are taken for the things signified, and just as several concepts can be the signs of the same thing (although one is common, another proper), so the composition of the concepts is a sign of the identity of the things signified by those concepts. Because, therefore, the thing signified by the finite concept, as by the common sign, is the very thing which is signified by the concept of God, therefore, by compounding the finite concept in the intellect with the concept of God, this proposition is true ‘God is a being’; but the composition is not on behalf of the finite thus signified, but on behalf of the infinite signified in common.

145. Then to the proposition ‘God is the object in question, a being’ [n.144, init.], I reply: God is that which in reality is signified by being as by a common sign, and therefore in the intellect this composition is true ‘God is a being’, which composition is a sign of that identity.

146. When you say ‘God is not anything finite’ [n.144, init.], the statement is true, when speaking of identity in the thing, namely the identity which is signified and belongs to the signified things; but, when speaking of being as it is a composition in the intellect, the statement that nothing which in the intellect is a finite sign can be predicated of God in a composition is false. An example of this: ‘a man is an animal’, - in the intellect ‘animal’, as it is there the formal object, is a diminished being. But no diminished being is true of [the man] Socrates existing in reality.

147. So this is false, then, ‘Socrates existing is an animal’? - I reply: a composition is always made of concepts, and it is a sign and of things signified; but it is on behalf of material objects, which are signified by the concepts, and of identity, which is signified by the composition, such that if there is an identity of the things signified, namely of the material objects, the composition of the concepts, which are the formal objects, is true.

148. The point [n.139, 140] can also be further clarified. If there is posited for any universal a proper individual (to wit in reality, a proper individual for substance, a proper individual for animal, a proper individual for man, etc.), then not only is the concept of genus potential to the concept of difference, but the proper individual of the genus is potential to the proper individual of the difference. But if we take the proper individual of this concept ‘being’ which is individual in God, and if we take the proper individual of this which is ‘infinite’, it is the same individual, and it is not potential to itself.

149. But you ask at any rate: why does entity not have a proper individual in reality, which individual would be in potency to the individual of the determining feature, so that ‘this’ being is first understood before ‘infinite’ being is?

I reply, because when something is existent of itself, and is not merely capable of very existence, it has of itself whatever condition is necessarily required for existence; but being as it belongs to God - namely being through essence - is infinite existence itself and not something to which existence itself merely belongs (God is of himself ‘this’ and of himself ‘infinite’), so that infinity is in some way as it were first understood to be a mode of being through essence before it is understood to be ‘this’; and therefore one should not ask why ‘this’ being is infinite, as if singularity first belonged to it before infinity. And so is it universally in the case of things that can be beings through essence. Nothing such by participation is first of itself determined so as to be such by essence, both so as to be an infinite such and so as be of itself ‘this’.

150. And if you argue that individual includes individual, therefore common includes common, therefore if ‘this’ being includes ‘this’ infinity, and if being in common includes infinity in common, - I reply that the consequence is not valid, because individual includes some perfection which common does not include, and on account of this perfection it can formally include the infinite, and yet the common - by reason of the common concept - does not include it as an included concept, but is in some way determinable by it.

151. [To the second] - As to Avicenna Metaphysics II [n.40], the answer is plain from himself in Metaphysics VIII, as was said [n.122].

152. [To the third] - As to Damascene [n.41], the answer is plain from the Master [Lombard] in distinction 19 [Sentences I d.19 ch.9 n.182], because he puts species there ‘for some likeness of species to individuals’; there is however a greater unlikeness, according to Augustine, and therefore Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.6 n.11 denies species there as he also denies genus. Hence the definition of Porphyry [Book of Predicables ch.3] ‘species is said to be that which is predicated of many things in the what’ should be understood as meaning that the species in those many is multiplied as to its nature, but in the divine persons the divine nature is not multiplied; the species too has in itself a reality corresponding to it, potential to the proper reality of the individual, but the divine essence is in no way potential to the relation, as was said in distinction 5 question 2 [I d.5 nn.70, 113, 118-119, 132, 138].

153. [To the fourth] - To the final one, about wisdom [n.42], I say that wisdom is not a species of a genus as it is transferred to divine reality, nor is it transferred according to that idea, but according to the idea of wisdom as it is transcendent. But how such a thing can be transcendent was said in the principal solution, the third article [nn.114-115].

154. There is, however, a doubt about the wisdom which is in us, whether it is an individual of transcendent wisdom and of quality, or whether only of something else.

And it seems not to be an individual of either.

Because nothing contains the same thing under diverse predicates which are said in the ‘what’ about the same thing and are not subalternate; but transcendent wisdom and quality are not subalternate; therefore etc .

155. Again, transcendent wisdom is a property of being, - therefore being is not said of it in the ‘what’, nor conversely, from distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.131, 134-136]; therefore neither does anything in which transcendent wisdom is included include a being in ‘what’, because then it would be a being per accidens; for it would essentially include the idea of subject and property, and these do not make anything one per se but only per accidens.

156. If these arguments [nn.154-155] are valid, and the wisdom in us is only an individual of transcendent wisdom or only an individual of the genus of quality - the second of these does not seem it should be granted, because then wisdom would not be in us a perfection simply, which seems to be contrary to Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.4 n.6: ‘Every creature around us cries out’ etc. [n.71]; if the first of them is granted, then not every habit is formally in the genus of quality, but all that indicate perfection simply are transcendent.⁸⁰

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